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Barnett: The Problem of Consideration in Charitable Subscriptions
THE PROBLEM OF CONSIDERATION IN CHARITABLE
SUBSCRIPTIONS
The recovery by the plaintiff university on a charitable subscription contract in the case of Rouff v. Washington and Lee
University' is a recent decision supporting the contention that
"under modern decisions the charity is bound to win every
time".' A review of the cases decided during the past few years
shows a marked unanimity on the part of courts in allowing a
recovery without too much analysis of the fundamental rules
governing consideration in contracts.
It is not the purpose of this note to trace historically the
development of the law regarding such charitable subscription
contracts or to present in great detail the problems raised by the
decisions. The material dealing with these questions is plentiful.8
Rather the primary purpose here is to notice the trend of recent
decisions and thus indicate the present condition of this interesting phase of contract law.
Professor Billig has classified the cases into four groups with
regard to the approach employed by the various courts in allowing a recovery: (a) cases in which the subscription is held to be
an offer of a unilateral contract wherein the promisee charity
has performed labor or expended money in reliance thereon; (b)
the "multi-lateral" contract group of cases in which the promises
of the various subscribers are held to be consideration for each
other; (c) the cases in which there is a counter-promise of the
promisee charity that the money will be expended for the objects
for which the subscription was made; and (d) promissory estoppel.'
A study of the recent cases reveals the fact that the courts
often have been reluctant to base their decisions on one ground
alone. Instead sometimes they support the result reached - presumably on some basis of so-called "public policy" - by enumerating other grounds than the one principally relied on, which
148 S. W. (2d) 483 (Tex. 1932).

'Billig, The Problem of Consideration In Charitable Subscriptions (1927)

12 CORN. L. Q. 467, 469, reprinted in SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAw or
CoNTriAcTs (1931) 542.
3Ibid; notes (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 270; (1928) 27 Micn. L. Rzv. 88;
(1928) 76 U. op PA. L. REv. 749; (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 823; (1928) 13 IowA
L. REv. 332; (1928) 12 MiNN. L. REv. 643; (1928) 2 CINN. L. REv. 287;
(1931) 18 CALIn. L. REv. 314; (1931) 11 ORE. L. REV. 106; (1931) 8 W. Y.
U. L. Q. REv. 689; (1929) 57 A. L. R, 986,
'13il11g, op. cit. supra n.2,
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are equally questionable in the light of the accepted views of
consideration. A majority of the cases show that courts are inclined to the first and second of the foregoing consideration
theories. New York is definitely committed to the first view although there are judicial declarations that a promise on the part
of the promisee is necessary to a recovery, even though this
promise be implied.' The decision in In re Reed's Estate, is
definitely placed on the ground of reliance on the promise of the
promisor. Since the act on which the promise was conditioned
was performed in the case of Washington Heights M. E. Church
v. Comfort' a valid contract resulted and the court was not faced
with the necessity of implying a promise on the part of the promisee. The court in a dictum mentions the promises of the other
subscribers as constituting consideration for each other, but this
can be given little weight in view of the preponderating rule in
that state.8 In the case of First ff. E. Church of Mt. Vernon v.
Howard's Estate the court first considers the orthodox New York
rule and notes the implied promise of the promisee to maintain
the War Memorial, but in conclusion states that this is a case of
"promissory estoppel" and can be supported on that ground independently of the implied promise. This is giving decided effect to the efforts of Professor Williston"° and Mr. Justice Cardozo' in their respective attempts to place the modern type of
subscription contract almost in a class by itself with a conception
of "consideration" peculiar to this particular alleged contractual
relation.
'Keuka College v. Ray, 167 N. Y. 96, 60 N. E. 325 (1901)

cited.

and cases

8133 Misc. Rep. 903, 233 N. Y. Supp. 450 (1929).
7138 Misc. Rep. 236, 246 N. Y. Supp. 450 (1930).
8"It has sometimes been supposed that when several persons promise to
contribute to a common object, desired by all, the promise of each may be
good consideration for the promise of others, and this although the object
in view is one in which the promisors have no pecuniary or legal interest,
and the performance of the promise by one of the promisors would not in
a legal sense be beneficial to the others. This seems to have been the view
of the chancellor as expressed in Hamilton College v. Stewart when it was
before the Court of Errors, 2 Den. 417 .... But the doctrine of the chancellor, as we understand, was overruled when the Hamilton College case came
before this court, 1 N. Y. 581 . . . . The doctrine seems to us unsound in
principle". Andrews, J., in Presbyterian Church of Albany v. Cooper, 112
N. Y. 517, 521, 20 N. E. 352, 3 L. R. A. 468(1889).
'133 Misc. Rep. 723, 233 N. Y. Supp. '451 (1929).

101

WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920)

§§

116, 139; CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT

(Am.L. Inst. 1932) § 90.
1 .... On the contrary there has grown up of recent days a doctrine
that a substitute for consideration' or an exception to its ordinary requirements can be found in what is styled 'a promissor7 estoppel' .... Certain,
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The recent decisions in other jurisdictions show interesting
judicial reactions to the problem of the charitable subscription.
In Huron Lodge No. 444 B. P. 0. E. v. Hinckley' consideration
is found in the expediture of money and labor in reliance on the
promise of the promisor, thus creating a binding contract. The
case of University of Southern California v. Brysone can be included in the first category, although the court justifies its result
by indulging in the New York presumption of a promise for a
promise. The true ground of recovery, however, is clearly that
of the offer of a unilateral contract with the promisee performing
labor and expending money in reliance on promise.
In the case of In re Chavez's Estate" the court passes lightly
over the problem of consideration by saying that reliance on the
promise is sufficient whether it be called estoppel or not.
The
court, by its very obvious desire to allow a recovery, can be said
to embrace the doctrine of promissory estoppel by dictum, for the
point of consideration was not treated as a necessary element of
the case. Hardin College v. Johnson15 is another case falling directly into this first group.
The foregoing resume indicates that many courts are finding
the theory of an offer of a unilateral contract the most appealing
rationale and the most adaptable device for deciding the usual
type of case which arises.
Still other courts are using the theory of the multi-lateral
contract as most ideally suited to the charitable subscription situation. In Lagrange Female College v. Corey,1' although the court
was not deeply moved by the question of consideration, recovery
was allowed on the theory that the promises of the various subscribers were consideration for each other. The same theory was
followed in the recent case of Greenville Supply Company V.
Wtitehurst" where, in allowing a recovery, the court said that
"where -several persons mutually agree to contribute to a comat least, it is that we have adopted the doctrine of promissory estoppel as
the equivalent of consideration in connection with our law of charitable
subscription."
Cardozo, Ch. J., in Allegheny College v. The National
Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 246 N. Y. 369, 373-374, 159 N. E.
173 (1927). In view of the actual ground of the decision this expression
is but obiter dictum.
50 S. D. 355, 210 N. W. 200 (1926); 222 N. W. 661 (1928).
1103
Cal. App. 39, 283 Pac. 949 (1930).
1 35 N. M. 130, 290 Pac. 1020 (1930).
1221 Mo. App. 285, 3 S. W. (2d) 264 (1928).
"168 Ga. 291, 147 S.E. 390 (1929).
17202 N. C.413, 163 S. E. 446 (1932).
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mon object then the promises are consideration for each other".
When the question of consideration arose in Y. M. 0. A. v.
Cawardr the court was faced with no obstacle, for the subscription recited the consideration as being "the wiping out of an ex"
isting mortgage", yet the court repeated the expression that the
promises of the subscribers were consideration for each other.
Finally, in Cotner College v. Hyland,9 Judge Burch, in holding
the promisor subscriber to his contract, observed: "In this state
there is no limitation on the right of a beneficiary of a subscription instrument to sue the subscriber, and the consideration for
the promise of each subscriber is found in the promises of others.
The doctrine may be sound or unsound, but it a wholesome one
in practice, and the court will not now depart from it."
As to the third suggested basis for supporting such contracts, no recent case has been found which can be placed definitely in that group. Perhaps it can be said that the present-day
court is somewhat unwilling to go so far in its presumptions when
more plausible theories are available.
The only case which goes squarely on the ground of promissory estoppel has been dealt with above.' Although the promissory estoppel idea has been attacked on the ground that it is
contrary to the orthodox view of estoppel,' if the term is used
with particular regard for the type of situation in which it occurs, and if it is given a meaning peculiar to these cases, it is
submitted that it is the most plausible of all the theories of legal
liability in the charitable subscription cases.
One court has said that "subscriptions are construed if reasonably possible to support recovery".'
Another court, as previously noted, described the doctrine of protecting the charity as
being "a wholesome one in practice".' The reason for this approach clearly is "public policy", since worthy charities exist
by virtue of such subscriptions. But, as has been suggested by
one commentator, when we consider the highly systematized
present-day subscription campaign methods, the high-pressure
salesmanship tactics employed to secure "pledges", and the great
number of charities seeking funds, it is at least questionable
213 Ia. 408, 239 N. W. 41 (1931).
133 Kan. 322, 323, 299 Pac. 607 (1931).

'First M. E. Church of Mt. Vernon v. Howard's Estate, supra n.9.
Cf. Billig, op. cit. supra n. 2, at 477, 478.
Huron Lodge No. 444 v. Hinckley, supra n. 12, at 222 N. W. 663.

Cotner College v. Hyland, supra n.19.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol39/iss2/6

4

Barnett:
The Problem
of Consideration
in Charitable Subscriptions
LAW QUARTERLY
VIRGINIA
WEST
whether "public policy" demands that the courts give such zealous regard to enforcing these contracts, even to the extent of overstepping the crystallized rules of contract law in order to reach
the desired result."
-FREDERICK

H.

BARNETT.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - FORCING RELEASE OF
INCHOATE DOWER UNDER STATUTORY SCHEME
A husband desiring to sell property sought to avail himself
of a statute providing for the compulsory release of inchoate
dower.' The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals granted
the relief sought, holding the statute in question not unconstitutional as impairing existing dower rights. Inchoate dower, being
only a possibility of an estate, is subject to the control of the
legislature (by dictum) even to the extent of destroying it. The
statute, being a proper exercise of this legislative power, is not
unconstitutional. Ruby v. Ruby.' These principles are supported
by the great weight of authority and require no further consideration here.
24

Note (1928) 13 CoRN. L. Q. 270.

'W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 43, art. 1, § 6. See text above n. 27, inf'a.
2
Ruby v. Ruby, 163 S. E. 717 (W. Va. 1932).
"That a wife's dower is inchoate until the husband dies: McNeer v.
McNeer, 142 Ill. 388, 32 N. E. 681 (1892) (overruling earlier Illinois decisions to the contrary); Pritchard v. Savannah St. & RR. Co., 87 Ga. 294,
13 S. E. 493 (1891); State v. Probate Ct., 137 Minn. 238, 163 N. W. 285,
L. R. A. 1917F, 436 (1917); Bushnell v. Loomis, 234 Mo. 371, 137 S. W.
257 (1911); Thornburg v. Thornburg, 18 W. Va. 522 (1881).
That inchoate dower interests are completely subject to legislative control;
Randall v. Kreiger, 23 Wall. 137, 23 L. ed. 124 (1875); Thornburn v.
Doscher, 32 Fed. 810 (D. Ore. 1887); Richards v. Bellingham Bay Land
Co., 54 Fed. 209 (C. C. A. 9th, 1893); Ferry v. Ry. Co., 258 U. S. 314, 42
S. Ct. 358, 20 A. L. R. 1326 and note (1922); Billings v. People, 189 Ill.
472, 59 N. E. 798 (1901); McNeer v. McNeer, supra; Buffington v. Grosvenor, 46 Kan. 730, 27 Pac. 137 (1891); Hamblin v. Marchant, 103 Kan.
508, 175 Pac. 678 (1918); McAllister v. Dexter & P. R. Co., 106 Me. 371,
76 Atl. 891 (1910); Griswold v. McGee, 102 Minn. 114, 112 N. W. 1020,
113 N. W. 382 (1907); Magee v. Young, 40 Miss. 164, 90 Am. Dec. 322
(1866); Chouteau v. Missouri P. Ry. Co., 122 Mo. 375, 22 S. W. 458, 30
S. W. 299 (1894); Miner v. Morgan, 83 Neb. 400, 119 N. W. 781 (1909);
Moore v. New York, 4 Sandf. 456 (1851) ; aff'd, 8 N. Y. 110, 59 Am. Dec. (1853) ; Weaver v. Gregg, 6 Ohio St. 547, 67 Am. Dec. 355. and note (1856) ;
Long v. Long, 99 Ohio St. 330, 124 N. E. 161, 5 A. L. R. 1343 and note
(1919); Melizet's Appeal, 17 Pa. 449, 55 Am. Dec. 573 (1851); Shell v.
Duncan, 31 S. C. 547, 10 S. E. 330 (1889); Hamilton v. Hirsch, 2 Wash.
223, 5 Pac. 215 (1885); Thornburg v. Thornburg, supra; Bennett v. Harsm,
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